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Abstract
Following the adoption of a joint framework by euro-area countries in response to the
intensifying financial crisis in October 2008, Austria enacted a package of measures
including the Interbank Market Support Act (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, "IBSG"). In
addition to calling for the establishment of a new clearing bank to facilitate interbank
lending, IBSG permitted the Austrian government to guarantee debt securities issued by
other eligible institutions. Securities issued by eligible institutions with a maturity of three
years or less (five years in exceptional circumstances) were eligible for guarantee. According
to IBSG, the amount outstanding for all measures taken under the act could not exceed €75
billion. Of this, €4 billion was specifically allocated for guarantees of the clearing bank,
Oesterreichische Clearingbank AG (OeCAG). This was subsequently reduced to €50 billion.
The guarantee scheme established by IBSG was used by six institutions in addition to OeCAG,
for a total of approximately €25 billion (€24.05 billion, CHF 325 million, and ¥20 billion).
After being extended by one year the issuance window for guarantees closed on December
31, 2010. None of the participating institutions defaulted on the guaranteed debt. The
amount of guaranteed debt outstanding declined steadily, and all had matured by June 2014.
Keywords: credit guarantee, interbank lending, Austria

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.
1

Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2Claire E. Simon — Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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Austria: IBSG Guarantee Program
At a Glance
In line with a joint action plan for Euro area
countries, Austria passed the Interbank
Market
Support
Act
(Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, "IBSG")
to target disruption in the interbank
market caused by the intensifying financial
crisis. Under IBSG, the government called
for the establishment of a clearing bank to
facilitate interbank lending which was
authorized to receive federal guarantees. In
addition, IBSG permitted the Federal
Minister of Finance to guarantee newly
issued, senior debt securities issued by
eligible Austrian institutions.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To strengthen the interbank lending
market by establishing a set of government
guarantees to restore market functionality
Announcement
Date

October 27, 2008

Operational
Date

October 27, 2008

Date of First
Guaranteed
Loan Issuance

January 23, 2009

Issuance

Originally December 31, 2009;

Through the IBSG guarantee scheme, the Window
later extended to December 31,
government could guarantee securities Expiration
2010
with a maturity of three years or less (five Date
years in exceptional circumstances) issued
€75 billion, €4 billion allocated to
by Austrian credit institutions and
clearing bank; subsequently
insurance companies. IBSG capped the Program Size
reduced to €50 billion
amount of guarantees outstanding at €75
billion, with €4 billion reserved for
Six institutions in total for €24.05
billion,
guarantees for the clearing bank. This was Usage
CHF 325 million, and
subsequently reduced to €50 billion.
¥20 billion
Participating institutions had to have
sustainable business policies and adequate Outcomes
No defaults
capital ratios and were required to lend to
Part of a package including
corporate entities and individuals. Notable
creation of a clearing bank that
Additionally, the government would Features
could itself receive guarantees
review participants’ internal compensation
schemes. According to the Ministry of Finance, six credit institutions participated in the
program for a total of approximately €25 billion (€24.05 billion, CHF 325 million, and ¥20
billion). The Austrian government charged a fee for participation based on debt maturity and
issuer creditworthiness.
After being extended by one year, the program’s issuance window closed on December 31,
2010. No institutions participating in the program defaulted. The final security guaranteed
under IBSG matured in June 2014, at which point there were no guarantees outstanding.
Summary Evaluation
The limited scholarship on IBSG, which largely focuses on the clearing bank rather than the
guarantee scheme, asserts that the measures were successful in reinvigorating, but not
completely restoring, the Austrian interbank market.
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Interbank Market Support Act (IBSG Guarantee Program): Austria Context
$389.5 billion in 2007
GDP
$431.2 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Source: Bloomberg
$46,856 in 2007
GDP per capita
$51,709 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
Source: Bloomberg
converted to USD)
As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit rating (5-year
senior debt)

As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Source: Bloomberg
$400.4 billion in total assets in 2007
$450.0 billion in total assets in 2008

Size of banking system

Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP

Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial system

Source: Bloomberg
102.8% in 2007
104.4% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 100% of
financial system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 100% of
financial system in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
84.1% of total banking assets in 2007
81.7% of total banking assets in 2008

5-bank concentration of banking
system

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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26% of total banking assets in 2007
28% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in banking
system

Government ownership of banking
system

Existence of deposit insurance

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
0% of banks owned by the state in 2007
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
100% (90% for non-individuals) insurance on
deposits up to $22,727.00 in 2007
100% (90% for non-individuals) insurance on
deposits up to $22,727.00 in 2008
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset
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Overview

Background
Problems in the European interbank market were exacerbated by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 66). A number of unique
conditions in Austria caused further disruptions to interbank lending. In response, the
Austrian government passed a package of measures related to financial stability. This
package included the Interbank Market Support Act (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, or
“IBSG”), which established a State-guaranteed clearing bank and a guarantee scheme for
securities issued by other credit institutions, and the Financial Market Stability Act
(Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz, or FinStaG), which permitted state guarantees for individual
institutions as part of a recapitalization process (). The package was approved by the
European Commission (EC) under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which permits state aid
that remedies a serious disturbance in a member state’s economy (European Commission
n.d.). (Also see Appendix A for more information on the unique conditions in Austria and
specific programs adopted in response.)
Program Description
IBSG allowed the Austrian government to guarantee securities issued by Austrian credit
institutions and insurance companies. To be eligible for guarantee, securities had to have a
maturity of three years or less (five years in exceptional circumstances). According to IBSG,
any securities issued pursuant to section 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph 10 of the Banking
Act could be guaranteed (Republic of Austria 2008). This sub-paragraph defines the ability
of credit institutions to “[issue] fixed-income securities for the purpose of investing the
proceeds in other banking transactions (miscellaneous securities underwriting business)”
(Austrian Financial Market Authority n.d.). Only unsubordinated debt could be guaranteed.
The federal government charged a guarantee fee based on the maturity of the guaranteed
debt and the creditworthiness of the issuer. IBSG stipulated that the total amount of
guarantees outstanding could not exceed €75 billion, which included €4 billion earmarked
for the clearing bank, effectively making the budget for guarantees for existing credit
institutions €71 billion (Republic of Austria 2008). This was subsequently reduced to
€50 billion. There were individual caps established for each of the individual banks but the
criteria for determining these were not explicitly laid out.
To receive guarantees, participating institutions had to have sustainable business policies
and adequate capital ratios. Additionally, institutions were required to adhere to other
business conditions including lending to corporate entities and individuals, and the
government would review their internal compensation schemes (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009).
The scheme’s budget was subsequently reduced by €10 billion in 2009 and by
€15 billion in 2010 (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b).
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Outcomes
In addition to the clearing bank, six credit institutions participated in the government
guarantee program (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b). Two of the banks, Erste Bank and
Raiffeisenzentralbank AG, were two of the largest banks in Austria (Banks in Austria n.d.).
The maximum amount each institution was eligible to guarantee and the amount they
ultimately used is outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Maximum Guarantee Amounts
Credit Institution

Limit

Usage

Erste Bank Group AG

€6 billion

€4 billion and CHF 75 million

Kommunalkredit AG

€6.2 billion, CHF 250 million,
¥20 billion

€6.2 billion, CHF 250 million,
¥20 billion

Österreichische Volksbanken
AG

€3 billion

€3 billion

Raiffeisen Zentralbank
Österreich AG

€4.25 billion

€4.25 billion

Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank
International AG1

€1.35 billion

€1.35 billion

KA Finanz AG

€3.25 billion

€3.25 billion

Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b; Petrovic and Tutsch 20093
After being extended for one year, the issuance window for IBSG expired on December 31,
2010, at which point no new guarantees could be issued (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b).
No participating institutions defaulted on guaranteed debt, and the amount of guarantees
outstanding declined steadily before the remaining guaranteed debt matured in June 2014
(European Commission 2016).

_____________________________________________________________________
At the time of publication, the only publicly available data on the usage of the guarantee program appeared in
Petrovic and Tutsch’s working paper. This paper was published in July 2009, a year and a half before the
issuance window closed. Figures have been updated.
3
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Key Design Decisions

1. The IBSG guarantees were part of a broader package of measures adopted in response
to the financial crisis.
The guarantee scheme was authorized by the €75 billion Interbank Market Support Act
(IBSG) established the OeCAG, a clearing bank that could issue government guaranteed debt
to facilitate interbank lending and authorized the Minister of Finance to provide guarantees
for securities issued by eligible institutions. It was passed alongside the
€15 billion Financial Market Stability Act (FinStaG) as part of the Austrian Financial Market
Stability Package. FinStaG was a set of measures that authorized the Finance Minister to
“recapitalize and strengthen the capital base of credit institutions and insurance companies.”
This package of measures was introduced in response to the joint call from euro-area
countries for national legislation aimed at restoring financial market stability (Federal
Ministry of Finance n.d.-a).
2. The Interbank Market Support Act provided the legal basis for the Minister of Finance
to provide guarantees to eligible institutions.
The ISBG, which was established to strengthen the interbank market, allowed the Federal
Minister of Finance to guarantee securities issued by eligible institutions other than the
clearing bank pursuant to Section 66 of the Federal Budget Act (Republic of Austria 2008).
3. European Commission approval was required for the implementation of the
guarantee.
On October 31, 2008, a little less than a week after the IBSG was enacted, Austria notified the
European Commission of its passage. In a letter dated December 9, the EC notified the
Austrian government that though the guarantee scheme constituted state aid under Article
87(1) of the EC Treaty, it was permitted under Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty (Global Trade
Alert 2008). Article 87(3)(b) permits state aid “to promote the execution of an important
project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of
a Member State” (European Commission n.d.). This decision was consistent with an earlier
communication published by the EC, which stated that Article 87(3)(b) could be used as a
legal basis for aid measures like general schemes to address the financial crisis (European
Commission 2008).
As discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the guarantee in such a way as to
ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features.
4. Initially, outstanding guarantees could not exceed €75 billion.
IBSG stipulated that any measures taken by the Austrian government under IBSG could not
exceed €75 billion in outstanding funds (Republic of Austria 2008). Of this amount,
€4 billion was explicitly earmarked for guaranteeing the losses of the clearing bank, OeCAG.
The total budget was reduced by €10 billion in 2009 and by a further €15 billion in 2010,
making the new limit €50 billion. (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b).
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5. Solvent Austrian credit institutions and insurance companies were eligible to
participate.
In correspondence with the European Commission, Austrian authorities committed to
limiting participation to institutions with a Tier 1 ratio of at least 7%.
6. The Federal Minister of Finance could issue guarantees for any unsubordinated
securities issued pursuant to the Banking Act.
According to IBSG, any securities issued pursuant to section 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph
10 of the Banking Act (Republic of Austria 2008) were eligible for the guarantee. This subparagraph defines the ability of credit institutions to “[issue] fixed-income securities for the
purpose of investing the proceeds in other banking transactions (miscellaneous securities
underwriting business)” (Austrian Financial Market Authority n.d.). The European
Commission’s decision approving the guarantee program clarified that subordinated debt
would not be eligible for the guarantee.
7. Maturities could not exceed three years (five years in exceptional circumstances).
Securities were only eligible for government guarantee if they had a maturity of five years or
less (Republic of Austria 2008). In correspondence with the European Commission, Austrian
authorities clarified that typically the guarantee would only cover debt with maturities up to
3 years, but that in exceptional circumstances debt with a maturity of up to five years would
be eligible. The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity
requirements for eligible debt.
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible.
Guarantees were issued on debt denominated in Swiss francs and Japanese yen, as well.
9. Caps were set individually on institutions’ participation.
As evident from the outcome data, caps were established for each participating institution
separately (Petrovic and Tutsch 2009). However, it is unclear what criteria were used to
determine these caps.
10. Participation fees were assessed according to the maturity of the debt guaranteed and
the soundness of the participating institution.
The “Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank Debt” set forth on October 20,
2008, by the European Central Bank provided guidance on the fee structures to be imposed
by European countries establishing bank debt guarantee programs. Austrian authorities
adopted a fee structure consistent with this guidance.
For short-term debt with maturities of up to 12 months, the fee was equal to 50 basis points
on an annual basis.
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For medium-term debt with maturities of more than 12 months, the total participation fee
equaled 50 basis points plus the lesser of either: (1) the median of the five-year credit default
swap (CDS) spread of a participant’s debt instruments from the period of January 1, 2007, to
August 31, 2008, or (2) the median of the five-year CDS spread for debt instruments of the
participant’s rating category (based on a sample of large Eurosystem banks) over the same
date range.
11. Participating institutions agreed to a variety other conditions including lending
requirements, job-saving measures, compensation restrictions and restrictions on
advertising.
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize
. . . distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries brought
about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not specify
exactly what safeguards a program should include but required “an adequate combination”
of elements including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet
growth, share buybacks, and executive compensation some of which Austria adopted
(European Commission 2008). To receive guarantees, Austrian institutions agreed to a set
of behavioral commitments including:
1) Using proceeds for the benefit of the real economy through lending at market
conditions, particularly to small and medium-size enterprises and households.
2) Reviewing corporate compensation systems for appropriateness.
3) Taking job-saving measures.
4) Taking steps to avoid distortions of competition (e.g., refraining from advertising
based on the guarantee).
12. The issuance window for guarantees initially lasted until December 31, 2009 but was
extended to December 31, 2010.
Originally, guarantees under IBSG could only be issued until the end of 2009. This issuance
window was extended until December 31, 2010 (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.-b).

III. Evaluation
The limited analyses of IBSG have focused largely on the clearing bank, ignoring the effects
of the broader guarantee scheme on other Austrian credit institutions. In their analysis,
Schmitz, Weber, and Posch (2009) note that Austrian banks’ liquidity risk declined because
they were able to borrow larger amounts over longer periods but the interbank market was
not fully restored—because liquidity and maturities had not reached pre-crisis levels—
following the introduction of the bank package, though they do not disentangle the effects of
the two components of IBSG (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 67).
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In assessing Austria’s bank support measures generally, the European Commission has
concluded that “despite the significant costs, the use of bank support measures in line with
EU state aid rules helped to restructure the Austrian banking sector and preserve financial
stability” (European Commission 2016).
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VI.

Appendix A

In Europe, the interbank market was hit particularly hard by the 2007–2009 global financial
crisis. Unsecured interbank loans carried high premiums, market liquidity dried up, and
maturity terms shrank throughout late 2007 and early 2008 before the interbank market
largely ceased functioning altogether following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 66). In Austria, financial institutions were
affected by exposure to Lehman Brothers and Icelandic banks, as well as their activity in
central and southeast European markets (Kalss 2010, 528).
In response to these conditions, euro-area countries convened at a summit in October 2008.
The meeting resulted in a joint action plan calling for national governments to “improve
market functioning over longer term maturities” through the introduction of guarantee
programs for bank senior debt issuance (Summit of the Euro Area Countries 2008). In
Austria, this call was met by the passage of a financial market stability package that
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contained the €75 billion Interbank Market Support Act (IBSG) and the €15 billion Financial
Market Stability Act (FinStaG).
IBSG had two main components. First, it called for the establishment of a new, privately
owned clearing bank to facilitate interbank lending. The bank, Oesterreichische
Clearingbank AG (OeCAG) conducted regular auctions to match available deposits with
demands for credit. OeCAG could issue securities guaranteed by the federal government, and
the government pledged to cover a certain amount of the clearing bank’s losses. (See Simon
2020 for additional detail on the clearing bank.) Second, it allowed the government to
guarantee securities with maturities of three years or less (five in exceptional
circumstances) issued by other credit institutions. FinStaG allowed the Federal Minister of
Finance to recapitalize and strengthen the capital base of specific credit institutions and
insurance companies. (See Simon 2018 for more information on the FinStaG.)
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